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1. Introduction 
Foreign relations have a high status in the ever integrating world society and public diplomacy 
is an important tool to maintain these relationships. Especially within the European Union 
organism the work of the respective embassies constitutes a vital effort to keep the “machine” 
running. During an EU presidency the embassies are the most direct link to the other member 
states and hence forth an important component in the overall work for an EU presidency. 
Denmark held the presidency of the European Union for the first half of 2012, which created a 
great opportunity to experience the work of an embassy and public diplomacy at close range. 
My internship at the Danish embassy in Greece ran from 1 February until 31 July 2012. My 
inspiration for applying for an internship at the Danish embassy in Greece was not only the fact 
that Denmark had the chairmanship in the EU, but also the difficult economical situation that 
Greece finds itself in. With 5 consecutive years of recession going for a 6
th
, and great political 
challenges, Greece is facing a crisis that extends beyond the economical sphere and into the 
civil society.  
Greece’s difficult situation forced the country to ask for help by international creditors. In 2010 
Greece received their first bailout package of 110 billion Euros from the troika consisting of the 
EU, IMF and ECB. But the continuing downfall of the Greek economy quickly revealed the need 
for another loan. With a second loan agreement, accepted in March 2012, the Greek 
government committed themselves to find, amongst other things, savings amounting to 11.5 
billion Euros through 2013 and 2014, cut the minimum wages with 22 % and the pensions with 
5 %. Furthermore there will be no automatic salary raises before the unemployment rate is 
below 10 % and the number of public sector employees has to be reduced with 150,000 
people by 2015. 
The implementation of the bailout program, which is constructed to regain momentum for the 
Greek economy, has proven to be a huge challenge for the Greek politicians and has revealed 
many shortcomings and hampering measures in the Greek welfare system. The role played by 
the troika as the creditor and therefore also monitor of progress, is applying a pressure on the 
Greek state and demanding reform, which raises the question: How does the external pressure 
delivered by the troika, affect the reformation of the Greek welfare state? 
2. Methodology 
To provide the reader with an understanding of the context on which my analysis is based, I 
will start with an introduction of the internship host – the Danish embassy in Greece. I will 
focus mainly on the purpose and work of the political and economical department, as this 
carries out most of the public diplomacy work and was where the internship was placed. I will 
give an overall understanding of the function of an embassy and the practical manifestation of 
public diplomacy but will not go into detail will all my assignments because the workload also 
covers a wide range of administrative assignments. Instead I will focus on a daily and 
significant assignment – the media surveillance – which will be the practical offset of my 
analysis. Before describing my work with analyzing the media content, I will dedicate a section 
to describe the meaning of holding the EU presidency to the work at the embassy. The EU 
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presidency increased the workload at the embassy significantly and had a great influence on 
the work of the intern. Then I will continue with a description of the media surveillance.  
Having provided the context and basic elements of the internship at the Danish embassy in 
Greece, I will focus on the issue that received the most attention and interest from the 
embassy staff, the home office and the intern herself – the Greek crisis.  I will give a short 
outline of the Greek situation to provide the necessary background information. I will not give 
an in-depth analysis of the economical crisis in Greece or the becoming of the situation rather I 
will provide an overall insight of the current political and economical situation in Greece, as a 
platform for understanding the starting point of the discussion. Then I will engage in 
determining the theoretical frame of this project. Firstly I will summarize the discussions 
amongst scholars concerning the existents of a distinct Southern European welfare state 
eligible for separate analysis. Then I will proceed with the arguments of the distinct features of 
the southern welfare states and their shortcomings in terms of reform. When applying the 
theory on the knowledge obtained through the media surveillance and the public diplomacy 
involvement of the embassy, I will firstly determine that the Greek welfare state is part of what 
Ferrera calls the “southern syndrome” and its distinct characteristics separates Greece from its 
northern counterparts. Then I will emphasize the complications of reforming the Greek system 
and move on to discussing the impact the involvement of an external power has on the Greek 
welfare system. The last section will be my concluding remarks. 
3. The internship 
3.1 The role of the presidency 
That Denmark held the EU presidency during the first half of 2012 affected the work at the 
embassy in several ways. Firstly, it has a representative dimension which means that we were 
present at every briefing and as many events as possible. Having the chairmanship and 
facilitating the discussions at European Union-level meant that the official political position of 
the embassy’s host country (in this case Greece) in every EU-negotiation setting was relevant 
which meant that the public diplomacy work of the embassy was even more important. Good 
contacts were vital in situations when reports were needed on issues outside of the normal 
protocol, such as positions on technical issues in areas not usually of interest to Denmark. 
Having the EU presidency also meant we took initiatives to organize relevant discussions for 
the other EU embassies. Several briefings were held at different diplomatic status levels, 
where experts were invited to brief the EU circle about political and economical aspects of the 
Greek society. 
The EU presidency also provided the opportunity to expand the cultural diplomacy work, in 
order to strengthen the promotion of Denmark all together. Therefore several cultural events 
were held by or sponsored by the embassy. 
Because Denmark held the EU presidency the task of keeping track of the political and 
economical developments in Greece had high priority. Denmark’s work to complete a long list 
of open EU negotiations while sitting at the end of the EU negotiations table, were often 
interrupted by the focus needed on the situation in Greece. Therefore the political and 
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economical department of the embassy took great part in the preparations for meetings at EU 
level, and followed the political and economical developments in Greece intensively. 
3.2 Media surveillance  
One of the daily tasks as an intern at the embassy was to monitor the media landscape and 
report relevant information and analysis to the Danish Foreign Ministry. This task was specially 
created during the EU presidency and was part of the strengthened effort to support the work 
of the presidency. Observing the English-language newspapers daily, I had special topics of 
interest within the areas of Greek foreign policy and domestic political and economical issues. 
The latter was of strong presence because of the double elections for parliament together with 
the signing of the PSI-deal and the second loan agreement with the countries creditors.   
The media analysis was part of the political and economical department’s effort to provide 
insightful analysis of the Greek political and economical situation to the Danish foreign 
ministry and ministers.  
4. The Greek situation 
The Greek elections in 2009 brought the socialist party PASOK to power with George 
Papandreou as prime minister.  PASOK were in government when Greece received their first 
110 billion Euros bailout package from its international creditors – EU, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) – in May 2010, and were, in the fall 
of 2011, negotiating terms for a continuation of this bailout-deal because of the still worsening 
state of the Greek economy. After having reached agreement Papandreou called for 
referendum to ensure he had the people’s mandate to proceed with the bailout package. The 
2010 bailout included a strict line of austerity measures, such as cuts to government spending 
and public sector jobs, which were met with great resistance from the Greek citizens. The 
Greek citizen’s rejection of the austerity measures was manifested in several large strikes, 
which at times ended with violent confrontations with the police. Outside Greece, 
Papandreou’s felt need for ensuring public support by having a referendum, was ill-received by 
the country’s creditors – the troika – and they therefore suspended their economical 
assistance. Papandreou eventually withdrew the decision of a referendum which resulted in 
him stepping down as prime minister in November 2011.  
Because there still was an urgent need for Greece receiving a new capital injection in order not 
to declare state bankruptcy and having to exit the Euro zone, a new government was quickly 
instated to assure another bailout package. This government consisted of three political 
parties: The socialist PASOK, the conservative New Democracy (ND) and the far right-wing 
LAOS, with the technocrat Lucas Papademos as prime minister. The new government had the 
sole purpose of ensuring the second bailout-deal for Greece, and was to call for elections as 
soon as the negotiations were concluded.  
The negotiations were long and hard because of the demand from the troika for additional 
austerity measures; amongst other things the Greek government had to agree to the firing of 
150,000 public workers by 2015, closing of state bodies, public spending cuts and an extensive 
privatization program. The second memorandum of understanding (MoU) also had to be 
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approved in the Greek parliament, where many of the politicians chose not to support the 
terms for the bailout-deal – the government party LAOS was part of them, together with 43 
politicians from PASOK and ND. LAOS’ decision of not supporting the memorandum of 
understanding meant that they stepped out of the coalition government and for the 43 
politicians it meant exclusion from the pro-bailout parties, PASOK and ND. Another 
precondition for the final conclusion of the second loan agreement was the completion of the 
negotiations on private sector involvement (PSI), where the implicated parties had to accept a 
substantial loss, as a part of Greece’s effort to restructure and reduce their dept. The PSI-deal 
had an 85.8 % voluntary participation, which was a satisfying result and shortly after the PSI 
completion, the second bailout-deal of 130 billion Euros was a reality. 
The signing of the second MoU in March was the end of the sitting government, and elections 
for parliament were set to be held May 6. For many years the Greek political landscape has 
been dominated by two big parties, namely PASOK and ND, who have taken turns in ruling in 
one-party governments. But the result of the May 6 election was much more scattered – 7 
parties made it into parliament and the two traditional parties suffered a great loss in support. 
The outcome of this election sent a strong message to the Greek politicians that the Greek 
people wanted a political change and no more austerity. The Greek voters had chosen to vote 
for small and more extremist parties, where 5 out of the 7 parties (ND 18.85%, Syriza 16.78%, 
PASOK 13.18%, Independent Greeks 10.60%, KKE 8.48%, Golden Dawn 6.97% and Democratic 
Left 6.10%) were against the MoU and the included austerity measures. 
No party had enough votes to form a one-party government, and none of the three biggest 
parties after the election, succeeded in forming a coalition government. Therefore the 
president of Greece called for a reelection to be held at June 17. 
The May 6 election had proven a huge success for the radical left party, Syriza, who came in as 
the second largest party. Syriza was against the MoU but wanted to continue as a member of 
the Euro Zone and many opinion polls leading up to the June 17 election, showed a big 
possibility for an increase in support for the party. The political unrest due to the polarization 
of political parties supporting the MoU on one side, and the political parties opposing it on the 
other side, caused great concern to the country’s creditors who were now doubting Greece’s 
commitment to the program. 
The turnout of the June 17 election was pro bailout. The conservative New Democracy came 
out as the biggest party and formed a government with the socialist PASOK and the left-wing 
Democratic Left, which is exceptional at more than one level as the composition of ideologies 
is rare, it is only the third coalition government in more than 40 years and it consist of the 
archrivals PASOK and ND. 
The period of two successive elections halted the political process, because without a 
government no political decisions were made. This meant the obligations Greece had to 
implement in order to follow the program set out in the MoU were of target. 
With a new government in place, the focus is now on the government’s ability to get back on 
track with the bailout program. The overall aim of the adjustment program for Greece is to 
reduce the state deficit to 120% of GDP by 2020. But in order to receive payment from the 
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second loan package the government has to find savings amounting to 11.5 billion Euros 
through the next two years. The government is engaging in reform of the public sector (a plan 
to merger or abolish around 250 state organizations is already starting to take form) the 
opening of closed professions and it has emphasized the role of the extensive privatization 
program, that consists of the selling of state assets, which it intends to speed considerably up, 
in order to gain revenue and spark growth and job creation. 
5. Theory 
Since the early 1990s there has been much debate amongst scholars to whether there exists a 
distinct Southern European (SE) welfare state. Esping-Andersen and Katrougalos are scholars 
who consider the SE countries to be a variant of the conservative regime, and in the other end 
of the spectrum are scholars such as Ferrera and Petmesidou who argues that there exists a 
distinct SE model of social protection and welfare (Karamessini, 2007: 2-3).  
Esping-Andersen identifies three models of welfare states – Conservative, liberal and social 
democratic. He argues that the ideal types of welfare states and the principles embedded 
within them are clustered around these three highly diverse regime types because each type is 
organized according to its own distinct logic of organization, stratification and social 
integration. With his identification of three welfare regimes, Esping-Andersen offers a bird’s 
eye view of the broad characteristics of a social or historical situation (Gelissen 2002: 139). The 
essence of the three different welfare regimes is: 
  
• The liberal type of welfare capitalism embodies individualism and the primacy of the 
market. The state can interact with the market actively by subsidizing private welfare 
schemes or passively by keeping social benefits to a modest level. The liberal welfare 
state is a low-income state and there is little redistribution of incomes (Gelissen 2002: 
141). 
• The conservative welfare regime is influenced partly by the legacy of Catholic social 
policy and partly by corporatism and etatism
1
. The influence of the states concerns the 
maintenance of income benefits related to occupational status. In the conservative 
welfare regime the principle of subsidarity is another important characteristic, which 
emphasizes the role of the family. Because in terms of social benefits the state will 
only interfere when the capacity of the family to serve its members is exhausted 
(Gelissen 2002: 142). 
• The social democratic world of welfare capitalism aims at a system of generous 
universal and distributive benefits which does not depend on individual contributions. 
High involvement of the state and a social policy that aims at maximizing the capacities 
for individual independence are other characteristics of the social democratic welfare 
state (Gelissen 2002: 142).      
 
In the same end of the spectrum as Esping-Andersen is Katrougalos. He argues that a delayed 
construction of the welfare state and relative economic underdevelopment characterizes the 
SE countries and is the reason for the undeniable lag in terms of social spending. According to 
                                                          
1
 The idea that the state should control the nation’s economy and social conditions. 
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Katrougalos the latter is not a result of specific institutional and organizational features – 
hence the SE welfare states are not suitable for distinctive analysis (Rhodes 1996: 3). 
 
On the other side Petmesidou and Ferrera argues that the SE welfare states have distinct 
characteristics which makes them eligible for separate analysis. 
Petmesidou views familism and clientelism as the main elements of the SE countries’ 
distinctive mode of income generation and distribution, whereas Ferrera lists several features:  
“the high fragmentation and internal polarisation of the income maintenance systems 
of all four SE countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy), their departure from 
corporatist traditions with the creation of universalistic National Health Systems, the 
highly collusive mix between public and private actors and institutions and the selective 
distribution of cash benefits through clientelism and patronage networks” 
(Karamessini, 2007: 3). 
 
Much literature has been devoted to the debate of whether to place the SE welfare regimes 
under the categories drawn up by Esping-Andersen or whether they constitute a welfare 
regime type on their own. Because I intend to apply the theory on the practical experiences 
from my internship I will not engage in this discussion further in this paper. I concur with the 
arguments made by Ferrera and Petmesidou, because the reason events in Greece and the 
insight I have gain trough my internship, brings forward the difficulties of reform faced by a SE 
country – Greece. Therefore I will dedicate the rest of the theory section to the distinct 
features that separates the SE welfare states from other European welfare states. 
 
Differences between Northern and Southern Europe 
One of the features distinguishing Southern Europe from the North is the pattern of socio-
political development. The socio-political etiquette of the SE welfare states entails, besides 
specific features, different levels of development and institutional reform (Rhodes 1996: 1). 
The existence of a more profound heterogeneous social structure in Southern Europe, is a 
result of a late and territorially unequal modernization process, and is mark by a petty-
bourgeoise which has gain in significance, and a growing proportion of the population being 
self-employed in personal services and small traders. Another factor which affected the 
evolution of some southern systems, notably Greece, is the emergence of a new middle class 
which has exerted considerable influence on the distribution of welfare resources (Rhodes 
1996: 7-8).  
The development of social democracy also took a different turn in southern Europe. During the 
democratic transition in the 1970s a particular type of social democracy developed in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, which as a social force was much less well-established than in northern 
Europe. The social democrats in the south had to compete with well-organized communist 
parties, which were better rooted in the working class movement, and as a result the socialist 
parties became “the vehicles for the ascendance of a modernizing (and sometimes self-
promoting and corrupt) bourgeoisie” and more open to neo-liberal ideas (Rhodes 1996: 9-10).  
 
The southern syndrome 
The differences between the southern and northern welfare systems can therefore in part be 
ascribed to underdevelopment and a distortion of development in favor of certain privileged 
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groups when development actually occurred, because of the socio-political organization of the 
SE societies Rhodes (1996: 5).  
This has created what Ferrera calls the “southern welfare syndrome” and he specifies the 
principle characteristics as follows (Rhodes 1996: 5-6): 
• “a highly fragmented and ‘corporatist’ income maintenance system characterized by 
dualism and polarization in terms of income maintenance and pensions (which includes 
a particularly skewed distribution of both housing resources – i.e. ownership – and 
welfare transfers in favour of privileged sections of the elderly) (Castles and Ferrera 
1996); 
• a departure from corporatist traditions (typical of the ‘conservative’, continental 
model) in health care and the establishment of national health services; 
•  a low degree of state penetration of the welfare sphere (reflected in still low levels of 
welfare spending in these countries, apart from Italy); 
• a distinctive welfare mix (state/family/church/charity); and 
• extensive clientelism and ‘patronage machines’ which distribute cash subsidies to 
political client groups” (Rhodes 1996: 5-6).  
 
These features can be explained both in institutional and developmental terms (Rhodes 1996: 
6): 
• “the weakness of state institutions and the failure to endow these countries with a 
‘rational-Weberian’ civil service prior to the mass expansion of welfare programmes; 
• the prominence of parties as the main aggregators of social interests; 
• ideological polarization (and, in particular, the presence of a radical-maximalist and 
divided Left) in southern party systems. Thus, Ferrera attributes the internal imbalances 
in the Spanish and Italian income maintenance systems partly to party competition 
both within the Left (…) and between the Left and conservative, patronage-oriented 
parties (Ferrera 1996: 30–1)” (Rhodes 1996: 6). 
 
3 goals of welfare – effect of southern syndrome 
The challenge of every welfare system is to balance between the three goals of welfare: 
insurance against risk, the welfare safety net and income redistribution. As Rhodes point out: 
“Failure to achieve that balance results in a loss of social solidarity and/or a legitimacy deficit, 
as public support ebbs away“ (Rhodes 1996: 13-14). 
As regards the SE countries, keeping the balance between the goals of welfare brings forward 
the systemic flaws of what Ferrera calls “the southern syndrome”. Because of their incomplete 
and unevenly institutionalized welfare states the SE countries have only barely managed or 
failed to create this balance in the past. To exemplify this statement Rhodes states the 
following:  
“the insurance systems are marked by peaks of generosity, defended by unions who are 
wedded to the principles of corporatist social protection; the safety net has large gaps in all of 
these countries; and the distribution of costs and benefits has often been dictated by the 
influence of pressure groups and political lobbies rather than principles of equality or equity” 
(Rhodes 1996: 14). 
 
Problematic feature - institutions 
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The problematic features that undermine the effectiveness of policy and fuels undisciplne 
spending in SE countries are several. The institutional factors, according to Rhodes, are “the 
absence of a strong state technocracy, the prominence of political parties as aggregators of 
social interest ´, alongside the weakness of civil society, and the persistence of clientelism” 
(Rhodes 1996: 8). Furthermore the social heterogeneity and the existence of wide-ranging 
informal economies militate against universalism and the establishment of forms of solidarity 
based on more than ‘particularistic group structures’ (Rhodes 1996: 8).  
 
Problematic feature – authoritarian rule  
Another crucial factor that separates the southern societies from their northern counterparts, 
are periods of authoritarian rule, which especially in the case of Greece, have considerably 
disrupted the modernization process. The non-democratic interludes and structurally flawed 
democracy in SE countries have resulted in a distinctive legacy of the south (Rhodes 1996: 9): 
• “the weakness – and radicalization – of a Left excluded from government for significant 
periods in all of these countries; 
•  the resilience of institutional traditions established under authoritarian rule –  
corporatism in the cases of Greece and Spain; the persistence of an essentially state-
dominated system (the exclusion of organized interests, and a ‘state-charity’ view of 
welfare) in Portugal; 
• reactions against the policies of the authoritarian period, which, for example, in the 
Spanish case has contributed to the absence of a strong family policy, precisely because 
of the pro-natalist, antifeminist family policies of the Franco regime (Valiente 1996)”  
(Rhodes 1996: 9).  
 
The role of the family 
As a result of uneven, interrupted and incomplete welfare state development, the traditional 
pre-industrial forms of welfare, provided by the family and charitable institutions, are still 
more significant in SE countries and they are essential for filling important welfare protection 
gaps such as social benefits. The family is an important provider of social services and 
solidarity, which prevents social instability to evolve into social exclusion and social problems. 
The social role of the family also produces lower crime rates (Rhodes 1996: 10).  
 
Internal and External challenges 
The SE countries face the same internal challenges as the rest of Europe, where the 
demographic changes – aging – are forcing the welfare societies to restructure the pension 
systems. Furthermore, the gender/family/work nexus, which constitutes the traditional base 
from where welfare states have been build, is undergoing change because of the new family 
and labor market patterns (Rhodes 1996: 13).  
At the same time external factors such as globalization and movement towards a European 
Monetary Union also constrains policy choices, as the rapid changes of the ever more open 
world market generates concern over competitiveness and the economic dependency implies 
for inflation leading to income restraint (Rhodes 1996: 13). 
 
The SE countries also feel the influence of external channels. Because of pressure from beyond 
their boarders, like the consolidation of the single market, EMU convergence and greater 
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competition in the opening of world markets, the SE countries have had to adjust both their 
economies, administrative cultures and welfare states. But according to Rhodes these external 
pressures might benefit the SE societies in the long run: 
 
“To some extent these pressures will lead to greater conformity, in terms of budgetary 
discipline, the rationalization of bureaucracies, the reduction of clientelism and attacks on 
anomalies in taxation and benefits. In the process, the skewed nature of welfare provision and 
the peaks of generosity that are still characteristic of these systems should gradually be 
corrected, depending of course, on a political determination to tackle entrenched inequalities 
and take on the vested interests which defend them” (Rhodes 19-20). 
 
Stating this, Rhodes is not arguing that the basic features of the southern syndrome will vanish 
overnight. He recognizes that the administrative structure will remain fragmented and 
colonized by vested interests and that tax evasion and benefit fraud will remain a big problem. 
He also recognizes that reform of the healthcare systems, social security and pensions 
probably will fall behind expectations. Furthermore Rhodes states that reform of the SE 
societies inevitably, also is dependent on a reform of social attitudes together with the 
necessary reform of state administration. One reason for this is that clientelism in these 
countries is a profound part of the political system and is difficult to eradicate, because the 
political parties are dependent on client groups for support (Rhodes 1996: 20). 
 
Poor capacity to reform 
According to Ferrera one of the principle features of the southern welfare states is their poor 
capacity for reform in comparison to other European countries (Rhodes 1996: 16). But 
attempts to reform the welfare systems have been pursued in all SE countries. 
Since they joined the EU the SE countries have been searching for ways to improve 
effectiveness and steering capacity by reformation of the administrative and political 
institutional context of decision making. Bureaucratic reform agenda was pursued in order to 
manifest the administrative inefficiencies which’s extent surfaced with the need to implement 
EU directives, and the SE countries have therefore engaged in rationalization and 
reorganization processes since they joined the EU. 
Another way of improving the steering capacity has been to involve interest groups like 
employer associations and trade unions in the welfare reform process. During the 
democratization, the relations between government, unions and employers in Greece were 
the least developed in the SE countries (Rhodes 1996: 17). 
An area that has proven difficult to reform is the fiscal area, and progress has therefore been 
slow and problematic. In the case of Greece the line of least resistance is often chosen which 
means increasing the tax burden of the honest and those unable to easily evade (Rhodes 1996: 
16-17). 
 
Reforming the southern welfare systems either to deal with the original defects or to 
accommodate new challenges, will be heavily constrained by the southern syndrome 
characteristics which Rhodes summarizes to be “the strength of vested interests, clientelistic 
collusion, an absence of political consensus and the weakness and fragmentation of 
administrative structures”(Rhodes 1996: 15). Specifically for Greece some of the systems’ more 
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profound flaws are vicious circles of pre-political particularism together with an instrumental 
approach to politics, an absence of collective action and widespread distrust and negative 
expectations (Rhodes 1996: 15). 
6. Analysis and discussion 
 
The Greek system is characterized by clientelism, weak state institutions, a high strength of 
vested interest and corruption. The implementation of the program included in the bailout 
packages have been a slow progress with many difficulties. The high level of bureaucracy and 
the weak state institutions have complicated the administrative part of the implementation 
process a great deal.  
The Greek government had suffered a legitimacy deficit through many years of state 
mismanagement filled with vested interests and clientism, which is a result of failure to keep 
the balance between the three goals of welfare – insurance against risk, the welfare safety net 
and income redistribution, as Rhodes states. 
Furthermore the elections for parliament made the ideological polarization more clear as more 
extremist parties gained momentum and the radical left party, Syriza, greatly increased their 
support. The clientelistic tendencies in the Greek political system have also contributed to the 
prominence of political parties being the main aggregators of social interest, as they have been 
dependent on their client groups for support. 
Thus, the southern syndrome characterizes the Greek welfare state, and the problems caused 
by the systematic flaws of the southern syndrome are severely portrayed by the urgent need 
for reform and improvement of the Greek system. This has been made clear to the 
international society in the wake of the crisis and the many problems and complications 
connected to the implementation of the bailout program. The southern syndrome of the Greek 
welfare state manifests itself in the poor execution of the bailout program because of the 
extensive problems faced by the systematic flaws in the Greek welfare state when trying to 
implement reforms. 
Reform 
According to Rhodes the characteristics of the southern syndrome will heavily constrain 
reforms of the southern welfare systems. For Greece the vicious circle of pre-political 
particularism and the instrumental approach to politics are some of the systemic flaws of the 
Greek welfare state that constrains the reform process, because when a state function is based 
on certain interests these interest collide with the wish to reform.  
The structural reforms that Greece has committed to implement have only seen little progress 
because they have been disregarded in favor of the emphasis put on financial consolidation 
since the temporary government took over after Papandreou in 2011. Important to note is, 
that the structural reforms have had slow progress since the first bailout program in 2010, as 
they inflict big changes on the Greek system, the tendency (notably of the PASOK lead 
government 2009-2011) have been not to dedicate much attention or effort to structural 
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reforms and instead take “the easy way out” such as pension cuts, wage reduction and 
increased taxes in order to reduce government spending. This is also recognized by Rhodes as 
the line of least resistance. 
Reform of the tax collection system is another substantial and necessary change. The Greek tax 
collection system is known to be run by clientelism and corruption – the tax collectors, who 
collect taxes from companies, have been acting according to the allegedly 40-40-20 system, 
where 40 % of the amount goes to the tax collector, the company gets to keep 40 % and the 
last 20 % goes to the state. Of cause this is not the case for all tax collectors but neither is it the 
exception. 
The new government has vowed that they are determined to make major structural reforms in 
order to get the Greek economy back on track and to regain the trust from foreign investors. In 
terms of strengthening the institutions, Prime Minister Samaras emphasizes that: “Each step in 
administrative reform and e-government is implemented only if it leads to directly measurable 
simplification of procedures, whereas all steps are realized through horizontal cooperation 
among competent ministries. In this way, the efforts of one ministry do not cancel the efforts of 
the other” (Speech by the Prime Minister Antonis Samaras).  
This statement from the Prime Minister is part of the expressed intention of the Greek 
government to push forward with the implementation of the bailout program in order to get 
Greece back on track with the program. The outlining of the bailout program was a result of 
negotiations between the troika and the Greek government. To assist and monitor Greece’s 
execution of the program, officials from the troika are currently positioned in the country. 
Their presence is exerting a pressure on both the government and the Greek people, as they 
represent an external agent exerting power within the Greek sovereign state.  
External pressure 
The troika’s involvement in the recovering of the Greek economy is far-reaching. Experts and 
government officials from other European countries are assisting the Greek state body with 
their expertise, at many levels. Because the troika has a financial interest in Greece getting out 
of its black hole, due to the large sums of capital they assisted the country with – the latest 
loan package containing 130 billion Euros – they are applying a substantial amount of external 
pressure to the Greek government, the Greek people and the Greek welfare state. 
 
Though, the pressure exerted by the troika, even though we are talking about direct applied 
pressure, might be beneficial for the Greek welfare system in terms of budgetary discipline, 
rationalization of bureaucracies and attacks on anomalies in taxation, as Rhodes states as a 
possible effect of external pressure. But as he also states, this is unlikely to be a fast and easy 
transition. The EU has in terms of EU directives and other administrative features, been 
representing an external agent providing incentive for reform, since Greece joined the 
European Union in 1981, but no ground-breaking reforms of the Greek welfare system have 
taken place. The current economical situation in Greece and the obligations the country 
committed to when accepting the loan packages might provide the needed pressure for the 
Greek government succeeding to reform the welfare state. 
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Rhodes also argues that the reform of the state administration in SE countries is inevitably 
dependent on reform of social attitudes. This is supported by the clientelistic nature of the 
Greek society which is not only profound in the political system but it is also deeply rooted in 
the Greek mentality. For example is tax evasion very common in Greece, which is supported by 
the media frequently reporting on discoveries made by the Financial Crime Squad on citizens 
and businesses who owe thousands of Euros in taxes.  
7. Conclusion 
 
The difficult economical situation in Greece that resulted in the country asking for financial 
help by international creditors, has revealed many shortcomings in the Greek welfare system. 
The high level of vested interests, clientelism and the weakness and fragmentation of 
administrative structures supports the arguments made for Greece being part of the southern 
syndrome. The slow implementation of the bailout program has proven the need for reform of 
the political system and the state structure, but also a needed change of the Greek social 
mentality. Because the strong notion of clientelism and vested interests in the Greek political 
system, makes the already difficult task of reforming a state body even more complicated. So 
far only few reforms have been made and mostly in the areas which are best accessible and 
controllable for the state – such as the wages of government employees.  
The high degree of external pressure from the troika has so far not progressed the reform 
process additionally. It has more resulted in the Greek government using austerity measures to 
find shot term savings in order to please the country’s creditors, which has provoked great 
resistance to the presence of the troika in Greece among the Greek citizens. But 17 June 
Greece elected a new government, which in collaboration with the troika whishes to fulfill the 
country’s commitments in the bailout agreement. The government has not been in office long, 
but it has already had the challenge of finding savings of 11.5 billion Euros trough the next two 
years, which it is having great difficulties gathering. It is too early to tell whether the new 
government will be successful, but in terms of the theoretical framework Greece is facing 
enormous challenges and reforming the Greek welfare state which is characterized by the 
systemic flaws of the southern syndrome, will be a long and difficult process. 
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